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Abstract
Dynamic exchange economies with uncertainty are considered in which
information is released over innite time. The strong sequential core
of such an economy consists of those consumption processes where no
coalition of agents wishes to deviate at any moment for the rest of time.
Comparable to the optimality principle in dynamic programming, nec-
essary and suÆcient conditions for non-emptiness of the strong sequen-
tial core in stationary economies are derived, based on non-emptiness
of classical cores of certain static economies. The main result of the
paper is an existence result for stationary economies based on the
presence of a competitive equilibrium in an associated limit economy,
given a high enough discount factor. Moreover, suÆcient conditions
are given under which the strong sequential core contains only time
and history independent processes.
1 Introduction
One of the major diÆculties in modeling cooperation in a dynamic environ-
ment is the potential abundance of opportunities for coalitions to deviate

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from earlier agreements. As the initial positions of agents and coalitions
and their preferences may change over time, a contract that was originally
considered acceptable may no longer be so after some time. Thus, agents
or coalitions may tend to break agreements reached earlier in the game. In
the case of uncertainty, where information becomes available over time, this
is even more likely to occur. What was perceived as an acceptable agree-
ment when no information was available, may no longer be so after some
information has been released.
In a dynamic economy the classical core concept as introduced in Aumann
(1961) is still meaningful. A consumption bundle is an element of this core if
no coalition can make its members better o by pooling their own resources
and deviating at period zero for the rest of the time. The classical core,
however, ignores incentives for coalitional improvement that may arise in
subsequent periods. The classical core is essentially a static concept, for it
does not depend on the time structure or on the process of the release of
information.
These considerations motivate the search for a core concept that oers
a more appropriate view on cooperation taking place in a dynamic, rather
than a static environment. To the best of our knowledge, the concept of
the so-called sequential core was rst proposed in Gale (1978) in a model
of a monetary economy. Other core concepts that take into account the
dynamic structure of the environment have been proposed in Repullo (1988),
Koutsougeras (1998), and Filar and Petrosjan (2000). Kranich et al. (2001)
distinguish between a strong and a weak version of the sequential core. They
study both concepts in a deterministic setting where agents face a nite
sequence of transferable utility games. In Predtetchinski et al. (2001) the
notion of the strong sequential core is applied to an economy with two periods
and uncertainty where agents are given a possibility to exchange assets in
the rst period.
Despite the dierences in the models, the three mentioned papers share
a common approach to the denition of the strong sequential core. The
dynamic nature of the economy or game allows for a number of sub-economies
(or sub-games) to be identied. The consumption bundle (or vector of payo
streams) is then said to be a strong sequential core-element if it belongs to
the classical core of each of the sub-economies (sub-games) of the original
dynamic economy (game). Hence, at no particular moment of time can a
coalition improve by deviating for the rest of the time.
In general, it turns out to be too much to hope for non-emptiness of the
2
strong sequential core. In Predtetchinski et al. (2001) the strong sequential
core is dened in such a way that, as a set, it is weakly increasing in the
number of assets. In this sense, the presence of assets can potentially lead to
non-emptiness of the strong sequential core. Nevertheless, a number of nega-
tive results is established even in this context. Generic emptiness is shown in
the setting of a nance economy, and an example of emptiness is presented
even for asset structures satisfying a very strong condition of completeness.
The general conclusion is that, unless a complete set of state-contingent
contracts is available for trade, non-emptiness of the strong sequential core
cannot be guaranteed.
These negative results provide a motivation to augment the basic model in
a dierent direction, namely to consider a dynamic exchange economy with
innite time horizon. A dynamic exchange economy is an economy with
uncertainty where information is revealed gradually over innite time. The
process of the release of information is described by a sequence of partitions
that gives rise to a so-called event tree. At each node of this event tree
the utility functions and initial endowments are specied. Basically, we will
restrict attention to stationary economies. A dynamic exchange economy
is called stationary if the utility functions and the initial endowments do
not depend on time or history but only on the current state, of which there
are assumed nitely many. For stationary dynamic exchange economies the
question of non-emptiness is solved in the sense that the strong sequential
core is shown to exist whenever the discount factor that agents apply to
future utility streams is suÆciently close to one.
In more detail, the content of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we
give the denitions of the dynamic exchange economy, the classical core and
the strong sequential core. We will, however, not study the dynamic ex-
change economy in full generality but, in Section 3, introduce the subclass
of stationary dynamic exchange economies. In these economies there is a
nite number of so called current states that correspond one-to-one to given
exchange economies. A transition matrix gives the probabilities of reaching
each state from another one, and this then denes the event tree. We show
that the strong sequential core of this stationary dynamic exchange econ-
omy is non-empty if and only if in each state the static economy comprising,
roughly, the discounted expected value of all future utility streams has a non-
empty core. This result should be seen as a characterization of the strong
sequential core closely related to the idea of a value function in dynamic pro-
gramming. In Section 4 an existence result for the strong sequential core in
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a stationary dynamic exchange economy is provided. More precisely, this re-
sult says that a competitive equilibrium allocation of a specic limit economy
is in the strong sequential core whenever the discount factor on future utility
streams is suÆciently close to one. Section 5 concludes. The mathematical
proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 Dynamic Exchange Economies
A dynamic exchange economy is an exchange economy with uncertainty,
where information is revealed gradually over time. The process of the release
of information is modeled by an event tree. At all nodes of the event tree,
the consumption sets, elementary utility functions, and initial endowments
are specied.
Time and uncertainty. Let T be a nite or countable set of time periods and
let 
 be a sample space. The sample space is interpreted to be the list of all
possible paths that the economy can follow over time. We use the notation

  
 for an event, and ! 2 
 for a typical path.
The process of the release of information is described by a sequence of
partitions fF
t
g
t2T
of the sample space. The number of subsets in F
t
is nite
and the partition F
t
is ner than F
t 1
, i.e. for every event 
 2 F
t
there is an
event 

0
2 F
t 1
such that 
  

0
. At time zero there is no information, so
that F
0
= f
g.
A pair  = (t;
) with t 2 T and 
 2 F
t
is called a node; t() = t is
the date of node . The set D consisting of all nodes is called the event tree
induced by the sequence of partitions fF
t
g
t2T
:
D = f(t;
) : t 2 T; 
 2 F
t
g:
The subtree starting at node  = (t;
) 2 D is the set
D () = f(t
0
;

0
) 2 D : t
0
 t; 

0
 
g:
Any function X dened on a tree or a subtree will be referred to as a process;
we write X :  7! X

. A restriction of the process X dened on D to a subtree
D () is denoted by X
D()
.
We assume that there is a system of conditional probabilities (j), in-
terpreted as the probability of reaching node  given that we are in node
. In particular, () denotes the probability of reaching node  2 D , and
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P:t()=t
() = 1 for all t 2 T. Note that (j) is dened even when
() = 0.
Endowments, consumption sets, and utility functions. Let N be a nite set
of agents. There are L commodities at each node of the event tree. Agent
i 2 N has a consumption set X
i

 R
L
, and a Bernoulli (elementary, or
instantaneous) utility function u
i

: X
i

! R at every node  2 D . The
commodity space C is the space of all bounded processes X : D ! R
L
. The
consumption set X
i
 C of agent i contains all bounded processes X
i
on D
with values X
i

2 X
i

. Agent i 2 N owns the endowment process e
i
2 X
i
.
We assume that agent i's preference ordering over X
i
is represented by
the expected utility discounted to the initial node:
V
i
(X
i
) =
X
2D
() Æ
t()
u
i

(X
i

); X
i
2 X
i
;
where 0 < Æ < 1 is a given common discount factor. Note that this sum is
nite because X
i
contains only bounded processes.
This concludes the description of a dynamic exchange economy E.
Sub-economies. Let E
D()
denote the sub-economy of the economy E starting
at node  2 D . The consumption set X
i
D()
of agent i in this sub-economy is
the set of all bounded processes X
i
on D () with values X
i

2 X
i

. We assume
that the preference ordering over X
i
D()
can be represented by the discounted
expected utility conditional on node :
V
i
D()
(X
i
) =
X

0
2D()
(
0
j) Æ
t(
0
) t()
u
i

0
(X
i

0
); X
i
2 X
i
D()
: (1)
We continue with the denitions of the classical core for the sub-economy
E
D()
and of the strong sequential core for the economy E. Essentially, the
former denition requires that no coalition be able to make its members
better o by deviating at node  for the rest of the time. The latter denition
requires that no coalition be able to improve by deviating at any of the nodes
of the event tree. In this way, the strong sequential core takes away the
incentives for coalitions to rst agree to a proposed allocation but break the
agreement later on.
Denition 1 Process X 2
Q
i2N
X
i
D()
belongs to the classical core of the
sub-economy E
D()
, denoted C(E
D()
), if
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1.
P
i2N
X
i

0
=
P
i2N
e
i

0
for all 
0
2 D (),
2. there exist no coalition Q  N and no process Y 2
Q
i2Q
X
i
D()
such
that
P
i2Q
Y
i

0
=
P
i2Q
e
i

0
for all 
0
2 D () and V
i
D()
(Y
i
) > V
i
D()
(X
i
)
for all i 2 Q.
Denition 2 Process X 2
Q
i2N
X
i
belongs to the strong sequential core of
the dynamic exchange economy E, denoted SSC(E), if X
D()
2 C(E
D()
) for
all  2 D .
3 Stationary Dynamic Exchange Economies
In the rest of this paper attention is restricted to stationary dynamic economies.
3.1 Denition of a Stationary Dynamic Economy
In order to dene a stationary dynamic exchange economy the following
objects are needed:
a set S = f0; 1; : : : ; Sg of states;
probabilities (js) of transition from state s 2 S to state  2 S;
consumption sets X
i
s
 R
L
, Bernoulli utility functions u
i
s
: X
i
s
! R
and initial endowments e
i
s
2 R
L
for all i 2 N; s 2 S.
Below we will refer to the following assumption.
Assumption A:
(1)  is an irreducible matrix;
(2) the consumption sets X
i
s
are convex, closed and bounded from below
for all s 2 S; i 2 N ;
(3) the utility functions u
i
s
are continuous and concave for all s 2 S; i 2 N ;
(4) e
i
s
2 X
i
s
for all s 2 S; i 2 N .
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The stationary economy has an innite horizon: the set of time periods is
T = f0; 1; : : : g. The sample space 
 consists of all paths that the state
can follow over time, with the convention that only state zero can realize in
period zero. Formally,

 = f! : T! S : !
0
= 0g;
where we write !
t
instead of !(t). A typical element 
 of the partition
F
t
comprises all paths in 
 that have a common history up to date t + 1.
Formally, 
 2 F
t
if and only if 
 can be written as

 = f!
0
g  f!
1
g      f!
t
g  S S S    ; (2)
with (!
0
; : : : ; !
t
) being a common history preceding date t+1 of all the paths
contained in 
. A node  = (t;
), with t 2 T, 
 2 F
t
may be identied with
the collection (t;!
0
; : : : ; !
t
). The state !
t
2 S is referred to as the current
state at node . It follows from the denitions already given that zero is the
current state at the initial node. The operator s() : D ! S assigns a current
state s() to any node  in the event tree.
For the case S = f0; 1g, the event tree is partially reproduced in Figure
1. Numbers in bold type indicate the current states.
Let 
 2 F
t
and 

0
2 F
t
0
be events with t < t
0
, 
  

0
. The probability
of 

0
conditional on 
 (the probability that the node (t
0
;

0
) will be reached
conditional on the fact that the node (t;
) has been reached) is equal to
Q
t
0
 1
=t
(!
+1
j!

), for any ! 2 

0
.
Finally, the consumption sets, Bernoulli utility functions, and endow-
ments for agent i at node  are dened by
X
i

= X
i
s()
; u
i

= u
i
s()
; e
i

= e
i
s()
:
Denition 3 A process X with values in R
m
is time and history independent
if there exists a function x : S ! R
m
such that X

= x
s()
for all  2 D ; we
write X = fxg.
The endowment process is an example of a time and history independent
process.
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







Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P


















P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P

(0; 0)
(1; 0; 0)
(1; 0; 1)
 (2; 0; 1; 0)
 (2; 0; 0; 1)
 (2; 0; 1; 1)
 (2; 0; 0; 0)
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Figure 1: Event tree of a stationary economy with S = f0; 1g.
3.2 Characterization of the Strong Sequential Core for
Stationary Economies
This subsection has two objectives: (1) to provide a tractable criterion for a
given time and history independent process to be an element of the strong
sequential core of a stationary economy; (2) to give suÆcient conditions for
the strong sequential core of a stationary economy to contain only time and
history independent processes.
Consider a time and history independent process X
i
= fx
i
g with values
x
i
s
2 X
i
s
. The instantaneous utility of X
i
at the node  can be written as the
8
sum
u
i

(X
i

) =
X
2S
(s() = ) u
i

(x
i

); where (3)
(s() = ) =
(
1 if s() = ;
0 otherwise:
(4)
Substituting (3) and (4) into (1) gives
V
i
D()
(X
i
) =
X
2S
	(j) u
i

(x
i

); where (5)
	(j) =
X
2D ()
(j)Æ
t() t()
 (s() = ) : (6)
The number 	(j) is the expected value, discounted to node , of the process
that promises one unit of utility at a node  2 D () with current state  and
zero utility otherwise.
Lemma 1 	(j) :  7! 	(j) is a time and history independent process.
If the matrix  is irreducible, then 	(j) > 0 for all  2 S;  2 D .
An analytical expression for the corresponding function  (j) : s 7!  (js)
can be found in the appendix. One immediate implication of Lemma 1 is
that the process V
i
D()
(X
i
) :  7! V
i
D()
(X
i
) is a time and history independent
process whenever X
i
is.
Denition 4 The symbol E
s
denotes a pure exchange economy in which
R
(S+1)L
is the commodity space, X
i
=
Q
2S
X
i

is agent i's consumption set,
e
i
= (e
i

)
2S
is the vector of initial endowments, and v
i
s
: X
i
! R is the
utility function dened by
v
i
s
(x
i
) =
X
2S
 (js) u
i

(x
i

); x
i
2 X
i
: (7)
The relationship between the functions v
i
s
and V
i
D()
is described by the fol-
lowing equation:
v
i
s()
(x
i
) = V
i
D()
 
fx
i
g

8  2 D : (8)
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That is, the discounted expected utility of the time and history independent
process fx
i
g conditional on the node  is equal to v
i
s
(x
i
), whenever the current
state at the node  equals s.
The following lemma provides a criterion for a given time and history
independent process to be an element of the strong sequential core of a sta-
tionary economy.
Lemma 2 Let E be a stationary economy satisfying assumption A. Let
X = fxg be a time and history independent process. Then
1. X
D()
2 C(E
D()
) if and only if x 2 C(E
s()
):
2. X 2 SSC(E) if and only if x 2 C(E
s
) for all s 2 S.
Lemma 3 gives suÆcient conditions for the classical core of the stationary
economy to contain only time and history independent processes.
Lemma 3 Let E be a stationary economy that satises assumption A and
in which the matrix  is positive, X
i

= R
L
+
, u
i

are strongly monotone
1
for
all i 2 N;  2 S and strictly concave for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g;  2 S. Then
the classical core of any sub-economy E
D()
contains only time and history
independent processes.
We conclude this section with a criterion for non-emptiness of the strong
sequential core.
Corollary 1 Let E be a stationary economy satisfying all assumptions of
Lemma 3. Then
SSC(E) 6= ; ,
\
s2S
C(E
s
) 6= ;:
4 An Existence Result for Stationary Econ-
omies
In this section we consider a family of stationary economies E
Æ
parameterized
by the discount factor Æ 2 (0; 1). We will prove that the strong sequential
core of an economy E
Æ
is non-empty whenever Æ is suÆciently close to one.
1
The function u
i

is strongly monotone if the following condition is satised:

x
i

; y
i

2
R
L
+
; x
i
;l
 y
i
;l
8 l 2 f1; : : : ; Lg; x
i

6= y
i


implies

u
i

(x
i

) > u
i

(y
i

)

.
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Our approach is to compute the limits for the utility functions v
i
s
as Æ
approaches one, and next to construct an economy using the resulting utility
functions. This articial economy will then provide us with some plausible
candidates to belong to the strong sequential core of the original dynamic
economy.
As is evident from equation (6),  is a function of the discount factor. To
make this dependence explicit we will write  (js; Æ). The utility functions
v
i
s
() of the economies E
s
depend on the discount factor through  ; we write
v
i
s
(; Æ) and E
s;Æ
.
Naturally, the value of  (js; Æ) goes to innity as Æ approaches one.
When multiplied by (1  Æ), however, it converges to a well-dened limit.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the matrix  is irreducible. Then the limit
(js)  lim
Æ!1
(1  Æ)  (js; Æ)
exists for all ; s 2 S. Moreover,
(1) the values of (js) are independent of s, i.e. (js) = (js
0
) for all
s; s
0
2 S;
2
(2) () > 0 for all  2 S;
(3) the vector  = (())
2S
is the eigenvector of the matrix , correspond-
ing to the eigenvalue  = 1.
Denition 5 The symbol E
1
denotes a pure exchange economy, in which
R
(S+1)L
is the commodity space, X
i
=
Q
2S
X
i

is the consumption set,
e
i
= (e
i

)
2S
is a vector of initial endowments, and #
i
: X
i
7! R is the utility
function dened by
#
i
(x
i
) =
X
2S
() u
i

(x
i

); x
i
2 X
i
:
Theorem 2 Let E
Æ
be a family of stationary economies that satisfy assump-
tion A and in which the Bernoulli utility functions u
i
s
are strictly concave and
locally non-satiated for all i 2 N; s 2 S. Let x be an equilibrium allocation
of the economy E
1
. Then there exists a Æ 2 (0; 1) such that fxg 2 SSC(E
Æ
)
for all Æ 2 (Æ; 1).
2
In what follows we suppress the argument s of .
11
It remains to augment the list of assumptions of Theorem 2 by assumptions
that guarantee existence of an equilibrium for the economy E
1
. We either
require that the endowments are interior to the consumption set, or, alter-
natively, that the utility functions are strongly monotone.
Corollary 2 Let E
Æ
be a family of stationary economies satisfying all as-
sumptions of Theorem 2 and at least one of the following conditions:
1. e
i
s
2 intX
i
s
for all s 2 S; i 2 N ;
2. u
i
s
are strongly monotone for all s 2 S; i 2 N .
Then there exists a Æ 2 (0; 1) such that SSC(E
Æ
) 6= ; for all Æ 2 (Æ; 1).
Below we give an example of a family of stationary economies of which the
strong sequential core is empty for all Æ 2 (0; 1). In this example the ma-
trix  is assumed to be positive, and the state-independent Bernoulli utility
functions are continuous, concave, and strongly monotone. Such an example
must necessarily violate the assumption that u
i

are strictly concave for all
 2 S; i 2 N .
Example Consider a family E
Æ
of stationary economies, in which N =
fa; b; cg, L = 1, and the Bernoulli utility functions are given by
u
i

(x
i

) = ln(x
i

); x
i

2 R
1
++
; i 2 fa; bg
u
c

(x
c

) = x
c

; x
c

2 R
1
+
:
We assume that the initial endowments satisfy the following conditions:
e
a

+ e
b

= 1; 8  2 S
e
c

>
P
i2Q
e
i

 

min
s2S
P
i2Q
e
i
s

; 8  2 S; 8 Q  N : c 2 Q:
The transition probabilities (js) are positive for all ; s 2 S.
We introduce the additional notation:
t
i
s;Æ
= (1  Æ)
X
2S
 (js; Æ)e
i

:
12
Finally, we impose a joint restriction on the transition probabilities and the
endowments: for each Æ 2 (0; 1) there exist s; s
0
2 S such that t
a
s;Æ
6= t
a
s
0
;Æ
.
It is straightforward to show that C(E
s;Æ
) is a single-element set:
C(E
s;Æ
) =
 
t
a
s;Æ
1; t
b
s;Æ
1; e
c
	
:
The assumption with regard to t
a
s;Æ
guarantees that
T
s2S
C(E
s;Æ
) = ; for all
Æ 2 (0; 1). Since all the assumptions of Lemma 3 are satised, the criterion for
non-emptiness of the strong sequential core given in Corollary 1 is applicable.
This leads to the conclusion that SSC(E
Æ
) = ; for all Æ 2 (0; 1).
5 Concluding Remarks
The modeling of cooperation in dynamic environments has received little
attention in the literature so far. Although the classical core is well-dened
in this framework, it ignores incentives for coalitions to deviate at future time
periods.
We study the strong sequential core for innite horizon exchange economies
with uncertainty. At each date-state in such an economy, a sub-economy can
be identied. An allocation belongs to the strong sequential core if it be-
longs to the classical core of each sub-economy. It follows immediately that
the strong sequential core is a strengthening of the core. It is therefore not
surprising that the strong sequential core might be empty, even when the
classical core is not.
We restrict attention to stationary economies. These are economies where
at each date the economy is in one of a nite number of states. The state
determines the instantaneous utility functions and endowments of all agents.
Movement from one state to the next occurs according to an exogenously
given Markov process. We show that the strong sequential core only contains
time and history independent allocations. We are also able to characterize
the strong sequential core as the intersection of the classical cores of the
sub-economies corresponding to all possible initial states. This result is used
to show that the strong sequential core is non-empty when all agents in the
economy are suÆciently patient.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let node  2 D , state  2 S and date  2 T be given. Let L(;  j) be the
probability that the set of nodes
f
0
2 D () : t(
0
) = t() + ; s(
0
) = g
are reached, conditional on the fact that  has been reached. Then equation
(6) can be rewritten as
	(j) =
1
X
=0
Æ

L(;  j): (9)
It is straightforward to show that L(;  j) :  7! L(;  j) is a time and
history independent process, with corresponding function l(;  j) : s 7!
l(;  js). The value of l(;  js) is given by entry (; s) of the matrix 

.
It is the probability of a transition from state s to state  in  periods.
Let  be an (S+1) (S+1) matrix with (; s) entry equal to  (js). Then
equations (9) can be written in matrix form as follows:
 =
1
X
=0
Æ



:
Since the spectral radius of the matrix Æ equals Æ 2 (0; 1),
 = (I
S+1
  Æ)
 1
;
where I
S+1
is the identity matrix of order (S + 1). If the matrix  is irre-
ducible, then the matrix  is positive.
Proof of Lemma 2.
()) Suppose that there is a deviation y 2
Q
i2Q
X
i
from x by a coalitionQ in
the economy E
s()
. It then follows from equality (8) that the regular process
fyg that starts at the node  is a deviation from fxg in the sub-economy
E
D()
.
(() Suppose that there is a deviation Y 2
Q
i2Q
X
i
D()
from fxg by coali-
tion Q in the sub-economy E
D()
. Note that the process Y need not satisfy
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Denition 3. There exists, however, a time and history independent process
Z = fzg; z 2
Q
i2Q
X
i
that (a) is feasible for Q and (b) gives each member
of the coalition Q at least as high expected discounted utility at node  as
the process Y does. Such a process fzg would then be a deviation from
the process fxg in the sub-economy E
D()
. By equality (8), the allocation z
would be a deviation from x in the economy E
s()
.
Dene z by
z
i

=
1
	(j)
X

0
2D()
(
0
j)Æ
t(
0
) t()
 (s(
0
) = )Y
i

0
; (10)
for all i 2 Q and  2 S. Since the sets X
i

are assumed to be convex
and closed, z
i

2 X
i

. It is straightforward to verify that z is feasible for
Q. Continuity and concavity of the Bernoulli utility functions implies the
inequalities
u
i

(z
i

) 
1
	(j)
X

0
2D()
(
0
j)Æ
t(
0
) t()
(s(
0
) = )u
i

 
Y
i

0

(11)
for all i 2 Q;  2 S. We substitute inequality (11) into the equality (5) to
obtain:
V
i
D()
(Z
i
) =
X
2S
	(j) u
i

(z
i

)

X

0
2D()
(
0
j)Æ
t(
0
) t()
X
2S
 (s(
0
) = ) u
i

(Y
i

0
)
=
X

0
2D()
(
0
j)Æ
t(
0
) t()
u
i

0
(Y
i

0
)
= V
i
D()
(Y
i
) (12)
for all i 2 Q.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Let the process Y 2
Q
i2Q
X
i
D()
be feasible for the grand coalition in the
sub-economy E
D()
. If Y does not satisfy Denition 3, then there are ; & 2
D (); i
0
2 N such that s() = s(&) and Y
i
0

6= Y
i
0
&
. Since
X
i2N
Y
i

=
X
i2N
Y
i
&
=
X
i2N
e
i
s()
;
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there must exist i
1
2 N; i
1
6= i
0
such that Y
i
1

6= Y
i
1
&
.
Let the process Z = fzg be dened as in (10) for all  2 S; i 2 N . Note
that under the assumptions of Lemma 3 inequalities (11) and (12) hold true
for all  2 S; i 2 N .
Since the requirement of strict concavity is violated for at most one agent,
the utility function u
i
s()
must be strictly concave either for i = i
0
or for
i = i
1
. Let it be strictly concave for i
0
. Under the assumption that all
the transition probabilities are positive, (j) and (&j) are both positive.
Therefore, inequality (11) is strict for i = i
0
and  = s(), and inequality (12)
is strict for i = i
0
. Thus, the process Z weakly dominates process Y. Due
to continuity and strong monotonicity of the utility functions, however, the
equivalence between the weak and the strong notions of Pareto-optimality
holds true, i.e. it is possible to construct a process
~
Z that makes inequalities
(12) strict for all i 2 N .
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let 
1
; : : : ; 
n
(n  S + 1) be the distinct eigenvalues of the matrix .
The matrix  is a column stochastic matrix, i.e. its entries in a given col-
umn add up to 1. This implies that 
1
= 1 is an algebraically (and hence
geometrically) simple eigenvalue of the matrix ; that 1 = (1; : : : ; 1)
0
is the
eigenvector of the matrix 
0
corresponding to the eigenvalue 
1
, and that the
eigenvector of the matrix  corresponding to 
1
can be set positive.
Let  = TT
 1
be a Jordan decomposition of the matrix , where  is a
Jordan form. There is a unique Jordan block corresponding to the eigenvalue

1
and this block has order 1. Hence,  can be written as
 =

1 0
0  

; (13)
where   is a direct sum of those Jordan blocks that correspond to eigenvalues

2
; : : : ; 
n
. Observe that the matrix (I
S
  Æ ) is non-singular, whenever
Æ 6= 1=
j
; j = 2; : : : ; n.
The rst column of the matrix T , denoted cn
1
T and the rst row of the
matrix T
 1
, denoted rw
1
T
 1
are the eigenvectors of the matrices  and 
0
,
respectively. We can therefore set
cn
1
T >> 0 (14)
rw
1
T
 1
=  1
0
(15)
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for some nonzero scalar . Using the Jordan decomposition of the matrix 
we can write
(I
S+1
  Æ)
 1
= T (I
S+1
  Æ)
 1
T
 1
(I
S+1
  Æ)
 1
=

(1  Æ)
 1
0
0 (I
S
  Æ )
 1

Because (I
S
   ) is invertible,
lim
Æ!1
(1  Æ)(I
S+1
  Æ)
 1
= diagf1; 0g
lim
Æ!1
(1  Æ)(I
S+1
  Æ)
 1
= T diagf1; 0gT
 1
=
= cn
1
T  rw
1
T
 1
=  cn
1
T  1
0
: (16)
The following observations complete the proof of Theorem 1:
(1) (js) = T
;1
apparently does not depend on s.
(2) Since (js) cannot be negative, must be positive. On the other hand,
the vector cn
1
T was set positive. Hence, (js) is, in fact, positive.
(3) The vector  = cn
1
T is the eigenvector of the matrix  corresponding
to 
1
.
We introduce the following additional notation:
X

(Q) =
n
x

2
Q
i2Q
X
i

:
P
i2Q
x
i

=
P
i2Q
e
i

o
X(Q) =
Q
2S
X

(Q).
Let P
0
Q
(E
1
) denote the set of weakly eÆcient allocations for a coalition Q in
the economy E
1
. Recall that x 2 P
0
Q
(E
1
) if and only if x 2 X(Q) and there
is no x 2 X(Q) such that #
i
(x
i
) > #
i
(x
i
) for all i 2 Q. The sets P
0
Q
(E
s;Æ
) are
similarly dened for the economies E
s;Æ
. To prove Theorem 2 we need the
following.
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Lemma 4 Suppose that  is irreducible and that the Bernoulli utility func-
tions u
i
s
are concave. Let the coalition Q  N be given. Then
P
0
Q
(E
1
) = P
0
Q
(E
s;Æ
)
for all s 2 S and Æ 2 (0; 1).
Proof of Lemma 4.
An allocation x is an element of P
0
Q
(E
1
) if and only if there exist weights

i
 0 (i 2 Q);
P
i2Q

i
= 1; such that x maximizes the function
X
i2Q

i
#
i
(x
i
) =
X
2S
()
X
i2Q

i
u
i

(x
i

)
over X(Q). Since all components of () are positive, this is equivalent to
the requirement that x

maximizes the function
X
i2Q

i
u
i

(x
i

)
over X

(Q) for all  2 S. Again, since all components of  () are positive,
this is equivalent to the condition that x maximizes the function
X
2S
 (js; Æ)
X
i2Q

i
u
i

(x
i

) =
X
i2Q

i
v
i
s
(x
i
; Æ)
over X(Q). This last condition is equivalent to x 2 P
0
Q
(E
s;Æ
).
Proof of Theorem 2.
We must show that for all values of Æ suÆciently close to one and for all s 2 S
the allocation x is in the core of the economy E
s;Æ
(see Lemma 2). Suppose
that this is not the case. Then there exist a state s 2 S, coalition Q  N ,
sequences Æ
m
2 (0; 1) and x
(m)
2 X(Q) such that
lim Æ
m
= 1;
v
i
s
 
x
i
(m)
; Æ
m

> v
i
s
 
x
i
; Æ
m

8 i 2 Q: (17)
Since X(Q) is a compact set, there is a subsequence of x
(m)
converging to
an element x of X(Q). Premultiplying inequality (17) by (1  Æ
m
), replacing
sequences by subsequences and taking the limit yields
#
i
(x
i
)  #
i
(x
i
); 8i 2 Q: (18)
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Let p be a vector of prices corresponding to equilibrium allocation x. Under
the assumption of local non-satiation of preferences, inequalities (18) imply
that
px
i
 pe
i
; 8i 2 Q: (19)
If there were some strict inequality in (19), then x would be not feasible for
coalition Q. Hence,
px
i
= pe
i
; 8i 2 Q:
The strict concavity assumption implies that there exists a unique maximizer
of the utility function in the budget set at prices p, i.e.
x
i
= x
i
; 8i 2 Q:
Hence, (x
i
)
i2Q
2 X(Q). This implies that allocation (x
i
)
i2Q
is not only
feasible, but also Pareto-eÆcient for the members of the coalition Q in the
economy E
1
. According to Lemma 4, however, the set of weakly eÆcient
allocations for any coalition in the economy E
1
coincides with that in the
economy E
s;Æ
for all s 2 S and Æ 2 (0; 1). Therefore, (x
i
)
i2Q
is weakly Pareto-
eÆcient for Q in the economies E
s;Æ
as well. This contradicts, however, the
original assumption.
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